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ABSTRACT  
DETERMINANTS OF WATER DEMAND IN MARGINALIZED URBAN 
AREAS IN LIMA-PERU AND THEIR IMPORTANCE IN IMPROVING 
SOCIAL WELFARE 
By  
Huamaní Antonio, Sandro Alejandro  
 
This research studies part of the water market from marginalized urban areas in 
Lima-Peru, where households are not provided potable water service with pipes by the 
Lima water company. Given this, consumers of marginalized areas pay higher prices from 
tank trucks services than consumers of the Lima water company. Therefore, the main 
purposes of this study are: (1) to identify the determinants of water demand using an 
instrumental variable regression, and (2) to know how social welfare changes when water 
price varies. For measuring this change, I use concepts such as consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, equivalent variation and compensating variation. I use data from the 
survey conducted by the Direct Marketing Research and Consulting, and the National 
Superintendence of Sanitation Services of Peru (SUNASS). Finally, the results suggest 
that consumption of water depends significantly on water price, number of people per 
household, the storage capacity of water that each household has and the level of income. 
Likewise, we found out that there is a strong negative relation between water price and 
social welfare; thus, public policies to regulate the level of water price are strongly 
recommended.  
JEL Codes: D12, D60, I31. 
Keywords: Lima-Peru, water service demand, social welfare. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background  
This research is focused on the water market in marginalized urban areas in Lima-
Peru, where consumers are households who do not have access to potable water service 
with pipes from the Lima water company, SEDAPAL1. Given this, the water suppliers 
in marginalized areas are small private companies that provide water via tank trucks. 
There is no regulation in this market or any kind of supervision by the potable water 
regulator. Using data from the Direct Marketing Research and Consulting (2015), I 
describe some characteristics about this water market.  
Regarding to demand, it is important to mention that households, who do not have 
access to drinking water service, are around 10% out of total households of Lima 
(SUNASS, 2015), about 195,600 households; and 90% out of them live in marginalized 
urban areas due to their economic condition. Likewise, 86% out of total consumers buy 
water from tank trucks, 11% from a neighbor and 3% from others. Since they do not have 
water tab in their house, they store water using different containers; thus 59% out of total 
demanders use cylinders or drums, 31% use water tanks and 10% use water bucket and 
tub (Huamani, 2017).  
One relevant characteristic in this market is that some households transport the 
water from the purchase point to their house (Bonifaz & Aragón, 2008). Overall, 18% 
out of total consumers transport water around one block, 6% around two blocks and 7% 
more than two blocks. Also, 49% out of households who transport water, the father or 
mother are in charge of this activity, 14% out of these households spend around 10 
minutes doing this activity, 18% spend between 10 and 20 minutes, 37% spend between 
20 and 30 minutes, and 31% spend more than 30 minutes.  
                                                            
1 “Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Lima” in Spanish.  
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Another characteristic of this market is the intensive reuse of water due to scarcity. 
In this regard, the water that is most reused is for laundry, then from dish washing, clothes 
washing, hand washing, showering, and food preparation (Huamani, 2017). 
Regarding supply, in most cases there is no competition between water suppliers 
because 58% out of total households buy water from one supplier, meanwhile, 16% from 
two suppliers and 26% from more than two suppliers. However, 42% of households, who 
buy water from more than one supplier, consider that there is no competition among their 
suppliers. Likewise, these households consider that competition factors are frequency of 
water supplying per week, water quality and water price level, in this order of importance. 
Finally, I use the Direct Marketing Research and Consulting survey, after 
eliminating some outliers, to estimate the average water price of this market which is 
around 15.7 PEN2/m3, and the average monthly consumption of water which is 6 m3. For 
this level of water consumption, SEDAPAL is charging an average price below 2 
PEN/m3 to its users, and given that the lack of intensive competition, we can infer that 
this market would have similar characteristics to no-regulated monopoly or duopoly 
market with an inefficient allocation of resources that will be reduced if there is a 
reduction in the water price (Harberger, 1954).   
1.2. Importance and objectives of this study  
The primary objective of this study is to identify the determinants of water demand 
in marginalized urban areas in Lima-Peru for households who do not have access potable 
water with pipes from SEDAPAL. I estimate the water demand equation using an 
Instrumental Variable approach regression due to reverse causality problem between the 
water consumption and the water price.  Likewise, the secondary objective of this study 
                                                            
2 Currency of Peru, “Peruvian Sol”. 
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is to know how social welfare changes with water price variations. To measure these 
changes, I define social welfare as the sum of welfare consumer and welfare producer. 
Knowing what the determinants of water demand are and how variation in water 
price can improve the social welfare is very important for designing effective public 
policies which will allow poor households from Lima to maximize the gain in welfare. 
Likewise, this study is relevant because there is a lack of studies on the characteristics of 
water market in marginalized urban areas. Findings of this study can be useful for public 
institutions such as SUNASS3, the drinking-water regulator, and the Ministry of 
Construction and Sanitation of Peru.       
1.3. Research question and hypotheses 
The main research question of the study is: what are the determinants of water 
demand in marginalized urban areas in Lima-Peru for households who do not have access 
to potable water service with pipes? The possible answer is my first hypothesis: the 
variation of water demand for households, who do not have access to drinking water 
service in Lima – Peru, is mainly explained by the variation of the following explanatory 
variables: i) water price, ii) family income, iii) water transportation time, iv) size of 
family, v) storage capacity of water. 
The second research question of this study is: how does social welfare change 
when the water price changes? The possible answer is my second hypothesis: reducing 
water price can significantly increase social welfare because an increase in consumer 
welfare is greater than a decrease in producer welfare.         
                                                            
3 “Superintendencia Nacional de Servicios de Saneamiento” in Spanish. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Classical Demand Theory  
In this section, I present a summary of the Classical Demand Theory which is 
considered a preference-based approach of consumer demand to know which variables 
determine the demand. This theory mentions that the demand is formed by the union of 
optimal points where the consumer maximizes his utility subject to a budget constraint.  
The analysis of consumer behavior begins by specifying the consumer’s 
preferences (≿) over the commodity bundles (X). This preference can define to rational 
consumers if it satisfies two assumptions: complete4 and transitive5 (Kreps, 2012).    
Likewise, there are two additional assumptions called desirability and convexity.6 
The first one refers that there is more preferable to have large amounts of goods than 
small (monotonicity). The second one concerns the trade-off that consumer is willing to 
make among different goods. It can be interpreted in terms of “diminishing marginal 
rates of substitution” (Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995). Both assumptions help us 
representing preferences using utility functions U(X) which are increasing and 
quasiconcave, but not continuous. For the existence of continuous U(X) is necessary to 
have one more assumption called continuity (Kreps, 2012). 
Then, having a rational consumer who has a continuous utility function, we can 
explore the following utility maximization problem:   
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝑋) 𝑠. 𝑡 𝑝𝑋 = 𝐼, (1) 
where p is a vector of prices and I is the level of consumer’s income. For simplicity, we 
shall suppose that the choice of consumer is considering just two goods (x1 and x2), so 
the previous constrained-optimization problem is replaced by: 
                                                            
4 For all x1, x2 ∈ X, we have x1 ≿ x2 or x2 ≿ x1 or both.  
5 For all x1, x2, x3 ∈ X, we have x1 ≿ x2 and x2 ≿ x3, then x1 ≿ x3.  
6 If  x2 ≿ x1 and x3 ≿ x1, then α x2+(1-α) x3 ≿ x1 for α ∈ [0,1]  
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𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝑥ଵ, 𝑥ଶ)    
s.t  
𝑝ଵ𝑥ଵ +  𝑝ଶ𝑥ଶ = 𝐼 (2) 
For getting the first-order condition, first we must write the Lagrangian function 
of this optimization as follows: 
𝐿 =  𝑈(𝑥ଵ, 𝑥ଶ) + 𝜆(𝐼 − 𝑝ଵ𝑥ଵ −  𝑝ଶ𝑥ଶ) (3) 
Then, the first-order condition is: 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑥௜
=  
𝜕𝑈(𝑥ଵ, 𝑥ଶ)
𝜕𝑥௜
− 𝜆𝑝௜ = 0 (4) 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝜆
=  𝐼 − 𝑝ଵ𝑥ଵ −  𝑝ଶ𝑥ଶ = 0 (5) 
It would not be necessary to satisfy the second-order condition because we have 
already known that it is a maximization. Then, solving these simultaneous equations, we 
can find the following Walrasian or ordinary demands (Chiang, 2005).  
𝑥ଵ∗ =  𝑥ଵ(𝑝, 𝐼)  
𝑥ଶ∗ =  𝑥ଶ(𝑝, 𝐼) (6) 
As we can see, the demand depends on a vector of prices, p, and the income, I, 
however, the demand can also depend on other economic and social variables (Varian, 
1992). It is important to mention that Walrasian demands must satisfy properties such as 
homogeneity of degree zero in (p, I), Walras’ law, convexity, and uniqueness (Mas-
Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995). Additionally, if 𝑥ଵ∗ and 𝑥ଶ∗ are introduced in objective 
function U(X), we can get the indirect utility function which is the maximum utility that 
a consumer can obtain given p and I:   
𝑉(𝑥ଵ∗, 𝑥ଶ∗) =  𝑉(𝑝, 𝐼) (7) 
Finally, if there are n consumers with rational preference relations, there could be 
an aggregate demand which can be written as:   
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𝑥(𝑝, 𝐼ଵ, 𝐼ଶ, . . , 𝐼௡) =  ෍ 𝑥௜(𝑝, 𝐼௜)
௡
௜ୀଵ
(8) 
The aggregate demand can be defined as the sum of the individual consumer 
demand, where this aggregation introduces three additional determinants of demand such 
as the number of consumers, the distribution of preferences among the consumers, and 
distribution of incomes among consumers (Jehle & Reny, 2011). 
2.2. Empirical studies related to water demand 
It is important to mention that almost all empirical studies which present a water 
demand estimation have used a sample of households who have access to drinking water 
demand from water companies, where consumers face increasing-block prices, i.e., 
nonlinear price (Jaramillo-Mosqueir, 2005). However, these cases are slightly different 
from the case addressed in this research, because, as we mentioned, our sample is 
composed by households who do not have access to potable water with pipes, so they 
have to buy the water from tank trucks and pay a linear water price.  
Respect to the methodology, the authors initially discussed about whether the 
price variable in a demand equation should be marginal price or the average price 
(Billings and Agthe, 1980). However, after Taylor (1975) and Nordin (1976), studies 
have focused on differences instead of marginal or average price to account for the lump 
sum transfers implied by increasing-block price. Likewise, we can find studies such as 
Opaluch (1984), which have considered marginal price and takes the difference inside 
the specification. In this context, authors have used several econometric techniques 
among OLS, 2SLS, instrumental variables and likelihood maximum estimation (Hewitt 
and Haneman, 1995). In recent studies such as Hewitt and Haneman (1995), Olmstead 
(2009) or Miyawaki (2011), they have used a the discrete continuous choice model 
11 
 
proposed by Hausman (1985) which is based in nonlinear budget sets due to increasing-
block price. 
Moreover, there are abundant studies for developed countries especially in urban 
areas where households have access to potable water services with pipes. For instance, 
Forster and Beattie (1979), Billings and Agthe (1980), Al-Qunaibet and Johnston (1985), 
Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), Pint (1999), Nauges and Thomas (2000), Cavanagh, 
Hanemann and Stavins (2001), Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins (2007), Miyawaki, 
Omori and Hibiki (2011), and among others.  
For developing countries, the literature is small. In particular, for Latin America, 
we can find principally studies written by Jaramillo-Mosqueir (2005) for Mexico, and 
Jimenez, Orrego, Vasquez and Ponce (2017) for Manizales city in Colombia, both using 
discrete continuous Choice model. Finally, for Peru, Ortiz and Bendezu (2006) used a 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) method; likewise, Huamani (2017) shows a preliminary 
estimation of the demand for household who do not have access to potable water with 
pipes using a OLS estimation.  
Finally, respect to the set of variables used in these estimations, most of the studies 
have considered the water price, family income, house size (number of rooms, 
bathrooms, etc.) and family size as principal explanatory variables. Additionally, 
Huamani (2017) considered other variables pertaining to the situation where households 
do not have access to potable water with pipes such as storage capacity of water in tanks 
and frequency that the tank trucks provide the service.   
2.3. Social welfare 
The discussion on how to specify the social welfare function (W) is limited. 
However, even though there are same certain general restrictions which eliminate the 
possibility of having an ideal relationship between individual preferences and the social 
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ordering (Arrow, 1951), there is a favorite assumption which states that the social welfare 
function is individualistic and provides an index which aggregate the individual utilities 
of economic agents, 𝑊(𝑢ଵ(𝑥), … , 𝑢௥(𝑥)), assuming that W increases with any ui given 
the utilities of all others (Sen, 1997). 
In this context, the most widely used approach is known as utilitarianism which 
considers that the sum of the individual utilities is a measure of social welfare of the 
form: 𝑊 = ∑ 𝑢௜௥௜ୀଵ . However, the problem with this approach is that maximizing the 
sum of individual utilities is unconcerned with the interpersonal distribution of the sum, 
i.e., it does not matter egalitarian reasons (Sen, 1997). An alternative approach with much 
stronger egalitarian criteria has been proposed by Rawls (1985), where the social welfare 
is defined by the function: 𝑊 = min (𝑢ଵ, … , 𝑢௥). Then, the social welfare of an allocation 
depends only on the welfare of the worst oﬀ agent (Varian, 2014).  
On the other hand, according to Microeconomic theory, the total welfare in a 
market is the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS). Therefore, 
changing of exogenous economic variables such as price of the good or income generates 
variation in the social welfare among variations in consumer surplus and producer 
surplus (Stiglitz, 2000). I explain in detail this concept in the methodology section.  
Additionally, to measure the variation in consumer welfare, we also can resort to 
the normative side of consumer theory, which is called the welfare analysis (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston & Green, 1995). First, we should construct a money metric indirect utility for 
any price vector p. However, depending if we use the initial price, p0, or a new price, p1, 
we can obtain two consumer well-known measures (Hicks, 1939), called: (i) Equivalent 
variation (EV) and (ii) compensating variation (CV).  
The EV can be defined as the money amount that the consumer is willing to accept 
for facing a price change. In other words, the change in his wealth that is equivalent to 
13 
 
price change in terms of welfare impact at p0. On the other hand, the CV can be defined 
as the money amount that planner must compensate the consumer for the price change 
after it occurs to keep the original utility level at p1. Formally, we can define them as 
follows:   
𝐸𝑉(𝑝଴, 𝑝ଵ, 𝐼) =  𝑒൫𝑝଴, 𝑉ଵ(𝑝ଵ, 𝐼)൯ − 𝑒൫𝑝଴, 𝑉଴(𝑝଴, 𝐼)൯ = 𝑒(𝑝଴, 𝑉ଵ) − 𝐼 (9) 
𝐶𝑉(𝑝଴, 𝑝ଵ, 𝐼) =  𝑒(𝑝ଵ, 𝑉ଵ(𝑝ଵ, 𝐼)) − 𝑒൫𝑝ଵ, 𝑉଴(𝑝଴, 𝐼)൯ = 𝐼 − 𝑒(𝑝ଵ, 𝑉଴) (10) 
where e(p,V) is the expenditure function which depends on prices and indirect utility. 
Additionally, the EV and CV have interesting representations in term of Hicksian 
demand curve, xh(p,V), which is a result of the expenditure minimization problem (Kreps, 
2012). then, if we define 𝐼 =  𝑒(𝑝଴, 𝑉଴) = 𝑒(𝑝ଵ, 𝑉ଵ), the EV can be written as:   
𝐸𝑉(𝑝଴, 𝑝ଵ, 𝐼) = 𝑒(𝑝଴, 𝑉ଵ) − 𝑒(𝑝ଵ, 𝑉ଵ) =  න 𝑥௛ଵ(𝑝ଵ, 𝑝ଶ, 𝑉ଵ)𝑑𝑝ଵ
௣భబ
௣భభ
 (11) 
Similarly, the CV can be written as:   
𝐶𝑉(𝑝଴, 𝑝ଵ, 𝐼) = 𝑒(𝑝଴, 𝑉଴) − 𝑒(𝑝ଵ, 𝑉଴) =  න 𝑥௛ଵ(𝑝ଵ, 𝑝ଶ, 𝑉଴)𝑑𝑝ଵ
௣భబ
௣భభ
 (12) 
Finally, for a normal good we should expect the following relationship for a 
decreasing of price, p1 (Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995): 
𝐸𝑉(𝑝଴, 𝑝ଵ, 𝐼) > ∆𝐶𝑆 > 𝐶𝑉(𝑝଴, 𝑝ଵ, 𝐼) (13) 
2.4. Water service and social welfare  
According to some studies, there would be a relationship between water service 
and social welfare because providing water service for poor people can increase the social 
welfare and generates social benefits that will be greater than social costs of 
implementing this public policy. For example, Hutton, Haller and Bartran (2007) have 
mentioned that there are at least two benefits of access to drinking water and sewerage. 
First, people can avoid several diseases as diarrhea or cholera and save money in buying 
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medicines. Second, people can avoid spending time of moving water from the sale point 
to their house.  
In the Peruvian case, Bonifaz and Aragon (2008) stated that people who do not 
have access to potable water with pipes pay higher price for buying water in tank trucks. 
Therefore, if they are provided with pipe water service by SEDAPAL consumers can pay 
a lower price and have a higher water consumption. Likewise, Bonifaz and Aragon 
(2008) estimated a cost overrun for households due to lack of water access in USD 160.23 
million based on transaction cost theory by Ronald Coase.  
Moreover, Oblitas (2010) identified three large areas where sanitation services 
contribute to improve the social welfare: (1) reduction of poverty levels, (2) increasing 
attendance levels and school performance, and (3) improving living condition. Oblitas 
(2010) mentioned that sanitation service reduces poverty because it decreases the 
expenses of medical attention, medicines and time of care for the sick; likewise, it 
decreases mortality rates and the family expenditure of water.  
In the same way, Huamani (2017), using a survey of 1000 households from Lima-
Peru, quantified three more benefits which are: (1) money saving, (2) health benefits, and 
(3) time saving. They were estimated in USD 26 million, USD 4 million and USD 56 
million per year, respectively. It means that the annual social benefit for providing 
drinking water to households who do not have access to is around USD 86 million. On 
the other hand, the infrastructure investments necessary for providing drinking water was 
estimated in approximately USD 730 million. Additionally, the operating expense was 
estimated in USD 27 million per year. Finally, using a cash flow of 30 years, Huamani 
(2017) demonstrated that social benefits are greater than social costs; thus, social welfare 
is bigger when potable water is provided. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Information collected 
For estimating the water demand, I use the data collected from the survey 
conducted by the Direct Marketing Research and Consulting in 2015. This was requested 
by SUNASS, the drinking-water regulator of Peru, to know how poor families obtain 
water, how much they consume, how much they pay per cubic meter, as well as the 
socioeconomic characteristics of consumers in Metropolitan Lima. After checking the 
information, I selected a sample size of 604 households because some observations 
presented atypical behavior. 
 Based on the SEDAPAL Tariff Study for the 2015-2020 regulatory period and 
prepared by SUNASS, the population of households who do not have access to water 
services is around 195,600, which was estimated using the information on: number of 
people in Lima (9.6 million), density (4.1 people per house) and drinking water coverage 
(91.6%). From the aforementioned information, a sampling error of 3.98% was 
estimated, which shows the reliability of the information to make statistical inferences. 
Table 1. Sampling Error 
Variable Value 
Population (Household)  195 600 
Sample  604  
Expected frequency of the parameter  0.5  
Z(α=0.05)=1.96  1.96  
Sampling Error  3.98%  
 
It is important to mention that the sample is probabilistic, multistage, and 
systematic. Each household had a known probability of being selected, which means that 
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the choice of observations was completely random. Likewise, the selection of 
observations was by three stages: selection by population centers, selection by 
conglomerates, and selection by households, respectively. Finally, it was systematic 
sampling because after making groups of households, observations were selected from 
each group.  
3.2. Estimation of water demand using an Instrumental Variable regression 
3.2.1. Why should we use Instrumental Variables (IV)?  
The Instrumental Variable (IV) regression approach can be used to solve 
endogeneity problem of one or more explanatory variables. This problem can be 
associated to mainly three cases which are: (i) omitted variable, (ii) measurement error 
and (iii) reverse causality or simultaneity. The endogeneity problem leads a biased and 
inconsistent OLS estimator (Wooldridge, 2016), so it cannot longer give a causal 
interpretation or be the marginal effect on the dependent variable of an exogenous change 
in an explanatory variable.  
In this study, there is reverse causality problem. Even though the consumed water 
quantity depends on the water price, the water price is also determined by consumption 
of water from household. As mentioned before, households that do not have access to 
drinking water service obtain the water from tank trucks which charge a water price in 
function of the type of container (water tank, reservoir, cylinder, tub, etc.) used for 
buying. It is easy to infer that these containers can store different volumes of water by 
liter, and households use them depending on the quantity of water they want to consume. 
Then, the water price is determined simultaneously or jointly by water consumption. In 
conclusion, the water price could be endogenous and would be correlated with the error 
term.     
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In this regard, it is important to define an instrument to correct the reverse 
causality problem and get unbiased and consistent estimators: however, this goal will be 
achieved only if we find valid instruments (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009) that satisfy two 
conditions: (1) relevance and (2) exogeneity. 
To clearly understand these conditions, let’s define the following multiple 
regression model: 
𝑦௜ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑝௜ + 𝛽ଶ𝑥ଶ௜ + 𝑢௜ (14) 
where y is the dependent variable (water demand or consumption of water), p (price 
water) and x2 are explanatory variables and u is the error term. Let us suppose that p is 
determined simultaneously by y, so p is endogenous, i.e., : 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑝, 𝑢) ≠ 0. Therefore, we 
should introduce an instrument, called z, which satisfy the conditions mentioned: 
 Relevance: This condition demands that z should have a causal effect on 
p, so 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝑝) ≠ 0. Likewise, changes in z can be associated with changes 
in y, but only through p.     
 Exogeneity condition: This condition demands that z should be exogenous, 
so it should not be correlated with u, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝑢) = 0. Likewise, z does not 
share common causes with y.  
Therefore, one of the challenges in this study is to find instruments which must 
have correlation with the water price, affect the consumption of water via price and be 
exogenous.       
3.2.2. Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression is an extension of the OLS method 
and it can be used in the analysis of equations.  In general, this technique, to obtain the 
best IV estimator, has a two-stage procedure: 
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i) In the first stage, we regress the endogenous regressor, p, on all exogenous 
variables, x2, and the instrumental variable(s), z.   
𝑝௜ = 𝜋଴ + 𝜋ଵ𝑧௜ + 𝜋ଶ𝑥ଶ௜ + 𝑣௜ (15) 
ii) In the second stage, we regress the dependent variable, y, on all exogenous 
regressors, x2, and the prediction of p.  
𝑦௜ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ?̂?௜ + 𝛽ଶ𝑥ଶ௜ + 𝑢௜ (16) 
In summary, the 2SLS regression breaks p into two parts, one that can be 
correlated with u, and the other is not. Then, by deleting the part which is correlated with 
the error term, 2SLS can provide unbiased and consistent estimator of β1. 
 In this regard, one important aspect to use 2SLS is to know the relationship 
between the number of instruments, dim(z), and the number of endogenous regressors, 
dim(x). This relation can be of three different types: (i) just-identified case if dim(z) = 
dim(x), (ii) under-identified case if dim(z) < dim(x), and (iii) over-identified if dim(z) > 
dim(x). 
 In the first case, transforming the zero correlation condition, 𝐸{𝑧′௜(𝑦௜ − 𝑥′௜𝛽)} =
0, in a vector form, 𝑍′(𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽) = 0, and solving, we can get the IV estimator:   
𝛽መூ௏ = (𝑍ᇱ𝑋)ିଵ𝑍ᇱ𝑦 (17) 
 In the second case, there will be an inconsistent IV estimator, so it is 
recommended obtaining enough instruments, even just one in applications with a single 
endogenous regressors. That is a challenge because it can require considerable ingenuity 
or access to unusually rich data (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).     
Finally, in the third case, 𝑍′(𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽) = 0 cannot be a solution because there is a 
system of dim(z) equations. Therefore, the more-efficient estimators can be obtained 
using the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator as follows:  
𝛽መଶௌ௅ௌ = {𝑋ᇱ𝑍(𝑍ᇱ𝑍)ିଵ𝑍ᇱ𝑋}ିଵ𝑋ᇱ𝑍(𝑍ᇱ𝑍)ିଵ𝑍ᇱ𝑦 (18) 
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3.2.3. Diagnostics for weak instruments 
Using a weak instrument can lead to substantial problems. For example, if there 
is even a small correlation between the instrument and error term (weak exogeneity) 
and/or the instrument has just a little correlation with the explanatory variable (weak 
relevance), the estimates would be inconsistent and biased (Wooldridge, 2016). 
Therefore, it is very important to detect weak instruments and avoid them. 
In this regard, Staiger and Stock (1997), and Stock and Yogo (2005) proposed a 
method to detect weak instruments based on the size of the t statistic or F statistic where 
there is one instrument or are more than two instruments, respectively.   
Thus, in the case of 2SLS, it is necessary to focus on the first-stage F statistic for 
excluded instruments, and then test a hypothesis in which the null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are weak and the alternative is that they are strong. For ensuring that the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the authors proposed that F statistic should be larger than 10. We 
should use the same rule using t statistic when we have just one instrument. 
3.3. Measure of the social welfare  
For finding a measure of the social welfare, first, we are going to suppose that the 
structure market is similar to no-regulated monopoly, because, as we mentioned in the 
background section, most of the consumers of water face just one supplier. figure 1 shows 
the current situation of water market in marginalized urban area in Lima-Peru., where we 
have a current water price (p0) which would be above the equilibrium price and current 
consumption of water (y0) which would be below the equilibrium quantity. In 
consequence, this situation leads to a deadweight loss (DL) due to allocative inefficiency 
(Harberger, 1954).  
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Figure 1. Current Situation of Water Market 
Based on the aforementioned, I consider a measure of social welfare as the sum 
of consumer welfare and producer welfare. That means, initially, the sum of all consumer 
(n) surpluses and all producer (m) surpluses, as an approximation of Utilitarian function.  
𝑊(𝑝ଵ, 𝑥ଶ) = ෍ 𝐶𝑆௜൫𝑦(𝑝, 𝑥ଶ)൯
௡
௜ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝑃𝑆௝൫𝑦(𝑝)൯
௠
௝ୀଵ
(19) 
where, consumer surplus (CS) is measured by the consumer’s willingness to pay minus 
the price actually paid, and producer surplus (PS) is measured by price received minus 
the cost of production.  
3.3.1. Variations in social welfare 
Previously, we notice that the social welfare depends on water price, p, and other 
explanatory variables, x2, so variations in p and x2 lead to variations in the social welfare. 
Likewise, variations in p and x2 can change water demand curve, y(.), in different ways 
and magnitudes. However, in this study, we will just concentrate in variation in water 
price, because it is the determinant which can be regulated in short term through public 
policies. 
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A variation in the water price, with x2 fixed, causes the consumer to choose a 
different market basket. In this study, I assume that water price can decrease until having 
equilibrium price (p1) and equilibrium quantity (y1) as shown in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Variation in Price 
Knowing the variation in social welfare is important to identify the level of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus before and after water price changes. According 
to before-after analysis, we found out that the variation in social welfare is area C+E, as 
shown in table 2. 
   Table 2. Variation in Social Welfare (Before - After) 
Variable Before After Variation 
Consumer surplus A A+B+C B+C 
producer surplus B+D D+E  E-B  
Social welfare  A+B+D A+B+C+D+E  C+E  
 
Mathematically, to calculate C+E area, it is necessary to estimate the variation on 
consumer surplus (ΔCS), which is the area B + C: 
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𝐵 + 𝐶 = න 𝑦(𝑝, 𝑥ଶ)𝑑𝑝 
௣଴
௣ଵ
 (20) 
Then, it is also necessary to estimate variation on producer surplus (ΔPS), finding 
the area E – B: 
𝐸 − 𝐵 = 𝑝ଵ(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) − න 𝑀𝐶(𝑦)
௬భ
௬బ
𝑑௬ − (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ 
𝐸 − 𝐵 = 𝑝ଵ(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) − 𝐴𝐶(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) = (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) −  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴  (21) 
Finally, the variation on social welfare in this case (Δp) is defined by: 
∆𝑊 = න 𝑦(𝑝, 𝑥ଶ)𝑑𝑝 
௣଴
௣ଵ
+ (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) −  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ (22) 
Likewise, as reference, Appendix A shows how the social welfare would change 
when there are variations in x2, with p fixed.  
Additionally, instead of variation on consumer surplus we can use other measure 
of consumer welfare such as compensating variation (CV) or equivalent variation (EV) 
as it was mentioned previously in the literature review. Figure 3 shows the CV and EV, 
in term of Hicksian demand curve, for a reducing of water price, p1. 
 
Figure 3. Equivalent and Compensating Variation 
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In the part A of figure 3, the area B + C1 represents the value of VC, which should 
be smaller than the variation of consumer surplus showed (B + C) in the figure 2 because 
of C > C1. Likewise, in the part B, the area B+ C1+C2 represents the value of EV which 
should be larger than the variation of consumer surplus because of C < C1 + C2. Then, 
using the previous figure, we can measure the CV as follows:  
𝐵 + 𝐶ଵ = (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ + (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)(𝑦௛ଵ஼ − 𝑦଴)/2 (23) 
Likewise, we can measure the EV as follows:  
𝐵 + 𝐶ଵ + 𝐶ଶ = (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦௛ଵா + (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦௛ଵா௏)/2 (24) 
Finally, the values of 𝑦௛ଵ஼௏and 𝑦௛ଵா௏are showed in Appendix B. 
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Estimation of the water demand  
As mentioned in the methodology, I estimate the water demand through Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) using instrumental variables and a cross-sectional database. 
To do this, I define first the model for estimation, then I choose the valid instrumental 
variables. Finally, I do a specification analysis about the 2SLS estimation. Therefore, my 
estimating model is: 
𝐿𝑛𝑄௜ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿𝑛𝑃௜ + 𝛽ଶ𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟௠௘௠௕௘௥௦,௜ + 𝛽ଷ𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧௜௠௘,௜
+𝛽ସ𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑝௜ + 𝛽ହ𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒௜ + 𝑢௜  (25)
 
In equation (25), we have the logarithm of monthly consumption of water in cubic 
meter (m3) per household (LnQ), the logarithm of water price (PEN/m3) per household 
(LnP), number of people per household (Number_members), how many minutes each 
households spends to transport the water from purchase point to house 
(Transportation_time), the storage capacity of water in liter that each household has 
(StorageCap), finally, a dummy variable where it takes the value of 1 if the income is 
bigger than PEN 315 monthly and 0 otherwise (DummyIncome). 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the main variables: 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Dataset 
Variable Units Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Q (Monthly consumption) m3 6.04 3.94 0.22 26.4 
P (Water price) PEN/m3 15.75 6.04 0.90 50.00 
Number_members number 4.76 1.81 1.00 12.00 
Transportation_time minute 3.30 8.65 0.00 30.00 
StorageCap liters 0.64 0.47 0.02 2.60 
DummyIncome dummy 0.31 0.462 0.00 1.00 
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As mentioned in the methodology section, it is necessary to use instrumental 
variables because water price is determined simultaneously or jointly by consumption of 
water. Therefore, the water price could be endogenous and would be correlated with the 
error term. Thus, in the following sub-section, I define valid instrumental variables.    
4.1.1 Choice of instrumental variables 
The variables used as instrumental variables are the set of the dummy variable by 
each district, where households without water service are located, due to the relevance 
and exogeneity condition. As a reference for checking the relevance condition, I see 
whether districts have a causal effect on water price, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝑝) ≠ 0, through the 
figure below, which shows a certain relationship between average price and districts.  
 
Figure 4. Average Water Price by District 
We can deduce that the mentioned relationship exists because the competition 
between supplier is different in each district (it could be explained for the difference of 
coverage of drinking-water service) and this situation can lead to difference in average 
water price. Districts with more competition would have a lower water price. This 
statement is consistent due to the correlation of -0.38 between the level of competition 
and district. 
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To make sure that there is a correlation between district and water price, I checked 
the result of the first stage of 2SLS. It shows that the p-value of most of the districts is 
lower than significance level of 0.05 or 0.10, which means that these coefficients are 
statistically significant. 
Table 4. First Stage of 2SLS estimation 
LnP Coef. Std. Err.      t          P>t 
 [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
District       
Carabayllo 0.706 0.091 7.760 0.000 0.527 0.884 
Comas -0.270 0.126 -2.150 0.032 -0.518 -0.023 
Puente piedra 0.373 0.122 3.070 0.002 0.134 0.612 
San Juan de 
Lurigancho 
0.131 0.084 1.550 0.122 -0.035 0.296 
San Juan de 
Miraflores 
0.351 0.054 6.520 0.000 0.245 0.456 
San Martin de Porres -0.050 0.061 -0.820 0.415 -0.171 0.071 
Villa el salvador 0.148 0.080 1.850 0.065 -0.009 0.304 
Villa maría del 
triunfo 
0.334 0.063 5.280 0.000 0.210 0.458 
Lurín 0.463 0.106 4.380 0.000 0.255 0.670 
Number_members -0.007 0.008 -0.820 0.410 -0.023 0.009 
Transportation_Time 0.001 0.002 0.810 0.416 -0.002 0.005 
StorageCap -0.142 0.037 -3.800 0.000 -0.215 -0.069 
DummyIncome 0.089 0.042 2.120 0.034 0.007 0.172 
Constant 2.511 0.070 35.940 0.000 2.373 2.648 
 
For the exogeneity condition, the variable district should not be correlated with u, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝑢) = 0. I can mention that district does not share common causes with 
consumption of water. In this regard, the figure below shows, as reference, that there is 
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no relationship between district and residuals of the second stage of 2SLS estimation 
from Table 6.  
 
Figure 5.  Relationship Between Residual and District 
Finally, to detect weak instruments, I use the rule from Staiger and Stock (1997) 
on the size of F statistic because there are more than two instruments. Table 5 presents 
the results of the test for weak instruments.  
         Table 5. Test for weak instruments 
F test of excluded instruments: 
F(9, 590)    21.22 
Prob > F        0.00  
 
Because the F statistic is larger than 10, I reject the null hypothesis that 
instruments are weak. In conclusion, the dummy variable for each district would be a 
valid, relevant and strong instrument.         
4.1.2. Estimation of water demand and discussion  
Table 6 presents the results of the second stage:         
 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Re
si
du
al
s
0
Ca
rab
ay
llo
Pu
en
te 
Pie
dra
Sa
n J
ua
n M
Vil
la 
Sa
lva
do
r
Lu
rin
District
28 
 
Table 6. Estimation of Water Demand by 2SLS estimation 
LnQ Coef. Std. Err.      t          P>t 
 [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
LnP -0.396 0.127 -3.110 0.002 -0.645 -0.146 
Number_members 0.062 0.014 4.570 0.000 0.036 0.089 
Transportation_Time -0.002 0.003 -0.850 0.395 -0.008 0.003 
StorageCap 0.527 0.053 9.970 0.000 0.423 0.630 
DummyIncome 0.157 0.056 2.800 0.005 0.047 0.267 
Constant 1.977 0.369 5.360 0.000 1.254 2.701 
Note: A specification analysis about this model is given in Appendix C. 
 
First, there is a negative relationship between consumption of water (demand) and 
the water price, which is consistent with Microeconomic theory. The price elasticity of 
demand was -0.396; if the water price increases by 1%, the consumption of water 
decreases by 0.396% which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The estimated 
demand is relatively inelastic, because the percentage change in consumption of water is 
less than the percentage change in water price. This was expected because water is a good 
which does not have many substitutes. Therefore, water price is statistically significant 
to explain variations of consumption of water. 
Second, there is a positive relationship between water demand and number of 
people in household; if the number of people increases by one, the consumption of water 
increases by 6.43% and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.7 
Third, there is a negative relationship between water demand and transportation 
time from water purchase point to house, so if the transportation time increases by one 
minute, the consumption of water decreases by 0.24%. Nonetheless, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant different from zero. 
                                                            
7For estimation the semi-elasticity for these variables:  Number_members, Transportation_Time, 
StorageCap and DummyIncome , we used: %∆𝑄෠ = 100൫𝑒ఉ೔∆௫೔ − 1൯ 
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Fourth, there is a positive relationship between water demand and the storage 
capacity of water that each household has; if the storage capacity increases by one liter, 
the consumption of water increases by 69.35%, significant at the 1 percent level. 
Fifth, there is a positive relationship between water demand and income, so if a 
household has income more than USD 315 monthly, the consumption of water is 17.01% 
more than a household with an income less than USD 315. 
On the other hand, the following table compares, as reference, estimations using 
OLS, 2SLS and different variants of Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). We can 
notice that the estimated coefficients have changed by less 10% among 2SLS model and 
GMM models. However, OLS result about price coefficient has a difference bigger than 
10% respect to 2SLS result, so it could be a signal that the instruments are working well.    
  Table 7. Comparison of models 
LnQ OLS 2SLS GMM_het(1) GMM_igmm(2) 
LnP -0.331*** -0.396** -0.381** -0.382** 
Number_members 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 
Transportation_Time -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
StorageCap 0.536*** 0.527*** 0.483*** 0.477*** 
DummyIncome 0.151** 0.157** 0.236*** 0.252*** 
Constant 1.798*** 1.977*** 1.963*** 1.978*** 
Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
(1) Optimal GMM given heteroskedastic errors. (2) GMM to iterate to converge. 
4.2. Impacts on the social welfare  
As mentioned previously in the methodology, I estimate the variation in social 
welfare as consequence of variation in water price, given that price is a determinant of 
the water demand that can be regulated in short run. In this regard, I estimate the variation 
in social welfare as the sum of variation in consumer welfare and producer welfare.  
For measuring the consumer welfare, we have used three measurements: (i) 
variation in consumer surplus, (ii) compensating variation and (iii) equivalent variation. 
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Whereas for measuring the produce welfare, I use the variation in producer surplus. Table 
8 shows the estimation result, simulating different levels of reducing of water price, 
which were obtained using equations, (22), (23) and (24): 
 
Table 8. Estimation of Variation in Consumer and Producer Welfare 
Objective of public 
policy on water 
price 
Water 
price  
Compensating 
Variation 
(CV)  
ΔConsumer 
Surplus 
(ΔCS) 
Equivalent 
Variation 
(EV) 
ΔProducer 
Surplus 
(ΔPS) 
 (PEN/m3) (USD '000/Annual) 
Reduce by 50% (1) 7.89 26,420.67 27,344.88 29,523.38 -18,828.95 
Reduce by 55% (1) 7.10 29,919.47 31,188.42 34,283.79 -21,623.58 
Reduce by 60% (1) 6.31 33,484.28 35,200.67 39,587.00 -24,608.93 
Reduce by 65% (1) 5.52 37,115.10 39,418.29 45,609.03 -27,821.66 
Reduce by 70% (1) 4.73 40,811.94 43,885.31 52,621.29 -31,335.12 
Reduce by 75% (1) 3.95 44,574.80 48,660.39 61,085.88 -35,244.68 
Reduce by 80% (1) 3.16 48,403.67 53,824.23 71,794.98 -39,726.36 
Price = AC (2) 2.35 52,379.24 59,670.23 97,636.19 -45,249.62 
Note: (1) The reducing is respect to current water price (15.78 PEN/m3) which is paid by 
consumers. 
(2) PEN 2.35 is the average cost of water service established by SEDAPAL Tariff 
Study for the 2015-2020 regulatory period.    
(3) Appendix D shows more details about the estimations. 
 
Consumer surplus increases considerably because consumers consume more 
when the price is lower. Likewise, reducing of water price leads to have positive values 
of the compensating variation and the equivalent variation, which get bigger when a 
reduction of water price is larger. It is important to mention that the relation between 
variation in consumer surplus, compensating variation and equivalent variation is 
reasonable and consistent with equation (13). 
On the other hand, the producer surplus decreases, because the profit of firms is 
reduced. However, for the society, the impact is positive since the variation in consumer 
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surplus, compensating variation or equivalent variation are greater than variation in 
producer surplus, as presented in Table 9:          
 Table 9. Estimation of Variation in Social Welfare 
  
As expected, there is a negative relationship between water price and social 
welfare regardless which measurement I use to estimate the consumer welfare. So, when 
the price is lower, social welfare will be greater. In an extreme case, if the government 
regulates the water price until it becomes similar to the average cost of water service 
provided by SEDAPAL, the social welfare would increase by 14,420.62 thousand of 
USD per year considering the variation of consumer surplus as consumer welfare, but if 
we consider the equivalent variation, the social welfare can increase up to 52,386.57 
thousand of USD. 
Since, a reduction in the water price in marginalized urban areas in Lima-Peru, 
where households do not have access to drinking water services, can significantly 
Objective of public 
policy on water 
price 
Water 
price  
Social 
Welfare 
(Using CV)  
Social 
Welfare 
(Using ΔCS) 
Social 
Welfare 
(Using EV) 
 (PEN/m3) (USD '000/Annual) 
Reduce by 50%  7.89 7,591.73 8,515.94 10,694.43 
Reduce by 55%  7.10 8,295.89 9,564.84 12,660.21 
Reduce by 60%  6.31 8,875.35 10,591.74 14,978.07 
Reduce by 65%  5.52 9,293.45 11,596.64 17,787.38 
Reduce by 70%  4.73 9,476.82 12,550.19 21,286.17 
Reduce by 75%  3.95 9,330.12 13,415.72 25,841.21 
Reduce by 80%  3.16 8,677.30 14,097.87 32,068.62 
Price = AC  2.35 7,129.62 14,420.61 52,386.57 
32 
 
increase the social welfare, then, designing public policies to regulate the water price is 
strongly recommended.  
In this regard, there could be two public policies which can help reduce the water 
price: (i) Economic regulation, where the government, through a regulator, define the 
water price level using regulation mechanism such as Rate of Return, which also 
guarantee the sustainability of water service in the long run; and (ii) increasing the 
coverage of water service provided by SEDAPAL. This would allow households who do 
not have access to potable water services with pipes to become consumers of SEDAPAL 
and get benefits such as lower price. This kind of policy produces several positives 
externalities, for example, better quality of water, decreased water transportation time, 
better continuity of service, etc.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
This research reveals that consumption of water at marginalized urban areas in 
Lima-Peru, where households are not provided potable water service with pipes by 
SEDAPAL, depends significantly on water price. In particular, the price elasticity of 
demand equals -0.396 which means that the estimated demand is relatively inelastic in 
accordance with microeconomic theory. Likewise, explanatory variables such as 
household members, the storage capacity of water that each household has, and the level 
of income are statistically significant to explain variations in water demand. However, 
transportation time from water purchase point to house is not statistically significant. On 
the other hand, there is a strong negative relation between water price and social welfare, 
i.e., reduction in price leads to increasing of social welfare due to an increase in consumer 
surplus, as well as the compensating variation or the equivalent variation are greater than 
reduction in the producer surplus. Based in both results, designing public policies to 
regulate the level of water price are strongly recommended to increase the social welfare 
of marginalized urban sectors in Lima-Peru.  
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VII. APPENDIX 
Appendix A 
How does social welfare change when some determinants (different from the 
price) change?  
A variation in x2, with p fixed, also causes the consumer to choose a different 
market basket. Now, let us suppose that one explanatory variable is better off (in this 
case, increases income), it generates a shift to the right of the water demand curve, which 
is shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 6. Variation in other Variables Different from Price 
Similar to price variation analysis, it is necessary to identify the level of consumer 
surplus and producer surplus before and after variation in x2. According to after-before 
analysis, the variation in social welfare is B+D+E area, as shown in the following table. 
       Table 10. Variation in social welfare (Before - After) by Income Variation 
Variable Before After Variation 
Consumer surplus A A+B B 
Producer surplus C C+D+E  D+E 
Social welfare  A+C A+B+C+D+E  B+D+E  
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Mathematically, to calculate B+D+E area, it is necessary to apply the following 
equations. For variation of consumer surplus: 
𝐵 = න 𝑦(𝑝, 𝑥′ଶ)𝑑𝑝 
௣ᇲ௠௔௫
௣଴
−  න 𝑦(𝑝, 𝑥ଶ)𝑑𝑝 
௣ ௠௔௫
௣଴
 
For variation of producer surplus: 
𝐷 + 𝐸 = 𝑝଴(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) − න 𝑀𝐶(𝑦)
௬భ
௬బ
𝑑௬ 
𝐷 + 𝐸 = 𝑝଴(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) − 𝐴𝐶(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) = (𝑝଴ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 
Finally, the variation in social welfare in this case (Δx2) is defined by: 
∆𝑊 = න 𝑦(𝑝, 𝑥′ଶ)𝑑𝑝 
௣ᇲ௠௔௫
௣଴
−  න 𝑦(𝑝, 𝑥ଶ)𝑑𝑝 
௣ ௠௔௫
௣଴
+ (𝑝଴ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 
(26) 
(27) 
 (28) 
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Appendix B 
Derivation of the Hicksian Demand of figure 3 
We can obtain 𝑦௛ଵ஼௏and 𝑦௛ଵா௏using the following equations:  
𝑦௛ଵ஼௏ = 𝑦଴ −
𝜕𝑦௛
𝜕𝑝
(𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ) 
𝑦௛ଵா௏ = 𝑦ଵ +
𝜕𝑦௛
𝜕𝑝
(𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ) 
Where డ௬೓
డ௣
 is the slope of the Hicksian demand curve. To calculate it, we will use 
Slutsky equation which relates changes in Marshallian demand to changes in Hicksian 
demand, which is known as such since it compensates to maintain a fixed level of utility. 
Formally, the Slutsky equation is defined by: 
డ௬
డ௣
= డ௬೓
డ௣
− 𝑦 డ௬
డூ
  
The slope of Marshallian demand curve, డ௬
డ௣
 , can be calculated using the estimated 
price elasticity which is shown in the table 6, the initial value of water price and initial 
value of consumption of water. However, the derivation of demand respect to income, డ௬
డூ
 
, cannot be taken from table 6 because the income  variable is a dummy. So, we will take 
the value of this derivation from Ortiz and Bendezu (2006) which has a reasonable value 
equal to 0.0013. 
 (29) 
 (30) 
(31) 
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Appendix C 
Specification analysis 
This appendix presents an evaluation of the econometrics model showed in table 
6. The fitted model has R2 = 0.226, which is reasonable for cross-section data. Likewise, 
four out of five regressors are highly statistically significant with the expected coefficient 
signs.     
On the other hand, in the next figure, it can be observed that the average of 
residuals would be around zero, with a dispersion quite concentrated in this average. We 
can infer from this that there is homoscedasticity, so it would be expected that the 
estimated coefficients are efficient. 
 
Figure 7. Residual Plot 
Likewise, applying the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis about constant variance because of the p-value (0.8245), so we also 
can infer that there is homoscedasticity. 
Table 11. Breusch-Pagan Test for heteroskedasticity 
Variable Value 
Chi2(1) 0.05 
Prob > chi2 0.8245 
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On the other hand, in the following figure, it can be observed that the average of 
residuals would be around zero, with a dispersion quite concentrated in this average. We 
can infer from this that there is homoscedasticity, so it would be expected that the 
estimated coefficients are efficient. 
Then, histogram of the residuals and Kernel density estimated, which are shown 
in the following figures, reveal that the distribution of the residuals look like a normal 
distribution, so we would say that the model has a reliable inference. 
 
Figure 8. Histogram of Residuals 
 
 
Figure 9. Kernel Density Estimation 
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Finally, about multicollinearity test, the mean of variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
less than 10, which means that there would be no relationship between the explanatory 
variables, so a multicollinearity problem would be discarded. 
    Table 12. Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
LnP 1.27 0.787 
Number_members 1.11 0.898 
Transportation_Time 1.08 0.923 
StorageCap 1.16 0.862 
DummyIncome 1.15 0.869 
Mean VIF 1.16  
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Appendix D 
Estimation of variation in social welfare because of reducing  
in water price by different cases 
 
Reduce by 50%  
Average 
household 
(PEN) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(PEN '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Annual 
ΔCS = B + C 37.28  7,291.97   2,278.74   27,344.88  
𝐵 =  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ 33.06  6,466.54   2,020.79   24,249.51  
C = (B + C)-B 4.22  825.43   257.95   3,095.37  
𝐸 = (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 7.39  1,445.48   451.71   5,420.57  
ΔPS= E – B  -25.67 -5,021.05  -1,569.08  -18,828.95  
CV = B + C1  36.02  7,045.51   2,201.72   26,420.67  
EV = B + C’1 + C2 40.25  7,872.90   2,460.28   29,523.38  
ΔW1= ΔCP + ΔSP 11.61  2,270.92   709.66   8,515.94  
ΔW2= CV + ΔSP 10.35  2,024.46   632.64   7,591.73  
ΔW3= EV + ΔSP 14.58  2,851.85   891.20   10,694.43  
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Reduce by 55%  
Average 
household 
(PEN) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(PEN '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Annual 
ΔCS = B + C 42.52  8,316.91   2,599.04   31,188.42  
𝐵 =  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ 37.13  7,262.63   2,269.57   27,234.86  
C = (B + C)-B 5.39  1,054.28   329.46   3,953.57  
𝐸 = (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 7.65  1,496.34   467.61   5,611.28  
ΔPS= E – B  -29.48 -5,766.29  -1,801.97  -21,623.58  
CV = B + C1  40.79  7,978.52   2,493.29   29,919.47  
EV = B + C’1 + C2 46.74  9,142.34   2,856.98   34,283.79  
ΔW1= ΔCP + ΔSP 13.04  2,550.62   797.07   9,564.84  
ΔW2= CV + ΔSP 11.31  2,212.24   691.32   8,295.89  
ΔW3= EV + ΔSP 17.26  3,376.06   1,055.02   12,660.21  
 
Reduce by 60%  
Average 
household 
(PEN) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(PEN '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Annual 
ΔCS = B + C 47.99  9,386.84   2,933.39   35,200.67  
𝐵 =  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ 41.21  8,060.68   2,518.96   30,227.54  
C = (B + C)-B 6.78  1,326.17   414.43   4,973.13  
𝐸 = (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 7.66  1,498.30   468.22   5,618.61  
ΔPS= E – B  -33.55 -6,562.38  -2,050.74  -24,608.93  
CV = B + C1  45.65  8,929.14   2,790.36   33,484.28  
EV = B + C’1 + C2 53.97  10,556.53   3,298.92   39,587.00  
ΔW1= ΔCP + ΔSP 14.44  2,824.46   882.65   10,591.74  
ΔW2= CV + ΔSP 12.1  2,366.76   739.61   8,875.35  
ΔW3= EV + ΔSP 20.42  3,994.15   1,248.17   14,978.07  
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Reduce by 65%  
Average 
household 
(PEN) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(PEN '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Annual 
ΔCS = B + C 53.74  10,511.54   3,284.86   39,418.29  
𝐵 =  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ 45.29  8,858.72   2,768.35   33,220.22  
C = (B + C)-B 8.45  1,652.82   516.51   6,198.08  
𝐸 = (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 7.36  1,439.62   449.88   5,398.56  
ΔPS= E – B  -37.93 -7,419.11  -2,318.47  -27,821.66  
CV = B + C1  50.6  9,897.36   3,092.93   37,115.10  
EV = B + C’1 + C2 62.18  12,162.41   3,800.75   45,609.03  
ΔW1= ΔCP + ΔSP 15.81  3,092.44   966.39   11,596.64  
ΔW2= CV + ΔSP 12.67  2,478.25   774.45   9,293.45  
ΔW3= EV + ΔSP 24.25  4,743.30   1,482.28   17,787.38  
 
Reduce by 70%  
Average 
household 
(PEN) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(PEN '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Annual 
ΔCS = B + C 59.83  11,702.75   3,657.11   43,885.31  
𝐵 =  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ 49.37  9,656.77   3,017.74   36,212.90  
C = (B + C)-B 10.46  2,045.98   639.37   7,672.41  
𝐸 = (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 6.65  1,300.74   406.48   4,877.78  
ΔPS= E – B  -42.72 -8,356.03  -2,611.26  -31,335.12  
CV = B + C1  55.64  10,883.18   3,401.00   40,811.94  
EV = B + C’1 + C2 71.74  14,032.34   4,385.11   52,621.29  
ΔW1= ΔCP + ΔSP 17.11  3,346.72   1,045.85   12,550.19  
ΔW2= CV + ΔSP 12.92  2,527.15   789.74   9,476.82  
ΔW3= EV + ΔSP 29.02  5,676.31   1,773.85   21,286.17  
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Reduce by 75%  
Average 
household 
(PEN) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(PEN '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Annual 
ΔCS = B + C 66.34  12,976.10   4,055.03   48,660.39  
𝐵 =  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ 53.45  10,454.82   3,267.13   39,205.58  
C = (B + C)-B 12.89  2,521.28   787.90   9,454.82  
𝐸 = (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 5.4  1,056.24   330.08   3,960.90  
ΔPS= E – B  -48.05 -9,398.58  -2,937.06  -35,244.68  
CV = B + C1  60.77  11,886.61   3,714.57   44,574.80  
EV = B + C’1 + C2 83.28  16,289.57   5,090.49   61,085.88  
ΔW1= ΔCP + ΔSP 18.29  3,577.52   1,117.98   13,415.72  
ΔW2= CV + ΔSP 12.72  2,488.03   777.51   9,330.12  
ΔW3= EV + ΔSP 35.23  6,890.99   2,153.43   25,841.21  
 
Reduce by 80%  
Average 
household 
(PEN) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(PEN '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Annual 
ΔCS = B + C 73.38  14,353.13   4,485.35   53,824.23  
𝐵 =  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ 57.53  11,252.87   3,516.52   42,198.26  
C = (B + C)-B 15.85  3,100.26   968.83   11,625.98  
𝐸 = (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 3.37  659.17   205.99   2,471.90  
ΔPS= E – B  -54.16 -10,593.70  -3,310.53  -39,726.36  
CV = B + C1  65.99  12,907.64   4,033.64   48,403.67  
EV = B + C’1 + C2 97.88  19,145.33   5,982.92   71,794.98  
ΔW1= ΔCP + ΔSP 19.22  3,759.43   1,174.82   14,097.87  
ΔW2= CV + ΔSP 11.83  2,313.95   723.11   8,677.30  
ΔW3= EV + ΔSP 43.72  8,551.63   2,672.39   32,068.62  
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Price = AC  
Average 
household 
(PEN) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(PEN '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Monthly 
Total of 
households 
(USD '000) 
Annual 
ΔCS = B + C 81.35  15,912.06   4,972.52   59,670.23  
𝐵 =  (𝑝଴ − 𝑝ଵ)𝑦଴ 61.69  12,066.56   3,770.80   45,249.62  
C = (B + C)-B 19.66  3,845.50   1,201.72   14,420.61  
𝐸 = (𝑝ଵ − 𝐴𝐶)(𝑦ଵ − 𝑦଴) 0  0   0     0    
ΔPS= E – B  -61.69 -12,066.56  -3,770.80  -45,249.62  
CV = B + C1  71.41  13,967.80   4,364.94   52,379.24  
EV = B + C’1 + C2 133.11  26,036.32   8,136.35   97,636.19  
ΔW1= ΔCP + ΔSP 19.66  3,845.50   1,201.72   14,420.61  
ΔW2= CV + ΔSP 9.72  1,901.23   594.14   7,129.62  
ΔW3= EV + ΔSP 71.42  13,969.75   4,365.55   52,386.57  
Note: Exchange rate used: 3.20 (PEN/USD) 
Note: For B + C, we have used this equation: ∫ 𝑦(𝑝, 𝑥ଶ)𝑑𝑝 
௣଴
௣ଵ =
 𝑒(ఉబା∑ ఉ೔௫೔)೔ಯభ ൬௣బ
ഁభశభି௣భ
ഁభశభ
ఉభାଵ
൰ 
